> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.aura.markets/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Resolution & Disputes

> How Aura's optimistic oracle settles markets, and how the commit/reveal vote handles disputes.

Aura uses an **optimistic oracle**: most markets resolve without any vote.
A bonded proposer states the outcome, and if no one disputes within the
challenge window, that outcome stands. When a market *is* disputed, neutral
\$AURA stakers settle it through a **tier-weighted commit/reveal vote**.

## Submitting an outcome

Once a market reaches its end date, anyone can submit a proposed outcome
(**YES**, **NO**, or one of the categorical options) by posting a refundable
**proposer bond** in USDT. This opens a dispute window.

* If no one disputes the proposal before the dispute deadline, the market
  automatically resolves to that outcome.
* The proposer's bond is refunded in full.

## Initiating a dispute

If another user disagrees, they can initiate a dispute by posting an equal
**disputer bond** in USDT before the dispute deadline. The market then enters
a structured commit/reveal vote.

Both the proposer and the disputer have funds at stake — the loser's bond is
forfeit, the winner's is doubled.

## The commit/reveal vote

The vote runs in two phases to prevent voters from copying each other's
choices:

<Steps>
  <Step title="Commit phase">
    Eligible voters submit a **hashed vote**: `keccak256(choice || salt)`.
    The choice is one of `YES`, `NO`, or `TOO_EARLY` (see below). Nobody can
    see what anyone else voted for during this phase.
  </Step>

  <Step title="Reveal phase">
    Once the commit window closes, voters reveal their vote by submitting
    the original `choice` and `salt`. The contract verifies the hash and
    counts the vote with the voter's tier weight.
  </Step>

  <Step title="Finalization">
    After the reveal phase, the protocol checks whether any single outcome
    cleared the **65% supermajority** threshold of revealed weight.
  </Step>
</Steps>

The build-tx endpoints for this flow are
[`POST /v1/tx/oracle/commit`](/api-reference/introduction) and
[`POST /v1/tx/oracle/reveal`](/api-reference/introduction).

### Why commit/reveal?

A naive "vote in one transaction" design lets later voters mirror earlier
ones, which collapses the vote into whatever the first big voter does.
Commit/reveal forces every voter to lock in their answer privately first,
then prove it after the deadline. The result is an honest snapshot of what
each voter believed at vote time.

### The `TOO_EARLY` option

Some disputes shouldn't resolve in either direction — the underlying event
hasn't actually happened yet, the data source isn't out, or the question is
malformed. Voters can pick `TOO_EARLY` to signal this.

If `TOO_EARLY` clears the 65% supermajority, the market is **canceled**:

* All open positions are unwound; share holders are refunded.
* Both the proposer's and disputer's bonds go to the **disputer** (the
  proposer made an avoidable mistake).
* Trading fees collected up to that point go to the treasury.

## Eligibility

Only **neutral \$AURA stakers** can vote in a dispute:

* You must hold a vaulted $AURA position above the **None** tier (i.e. at
  least the **Iron** tier, 60,000 $AURA).
* You must **not** hold any open position in the disputed market and must
  not have traded it during the dispute window. The contract enforces this
  by checking the market's stake-holder registry — any address that placed
  an order is excluded.

## What happens if no outcome clears 65%?

If neither `YES`, `NO`, nor `TOO_EARLY` clears the supermajority threshold,
the round is inconclusive. The protocol immediately starts a **new
commit/reveal round** with the same windows. This repeats until an outcome
wins decisively.

This is intentional — Aura would rather take longer to resolve a contested
market than ship a 51/49 result that half the market disagrees with.

## Voting power

Voting weight matches your staking tier:

| Tier       |   Voting weight |
| ---------- | --------------: |
| Degenerate |              30 |
| Diamond    |              22 |
| Platinum   |              16 |
| Gold       |              11 |
| Silver     |               7 |
| Bronze     |               3 |
| Iron       |               1 |
| None       | 0 (cannot vote) |

See [Tier Structure](/tokens/tier-structure) for stake requirements.

## Voter rewards (and penalties)

Aura's dispute system uses **slashing**, not protocol fees, to reward honest
voting:

* **Wrong-side voters** — anyone who revealed a vote for the *losing*
  outcome has **0.1% of their vaulted \$AURA** slashed per vote.
* **Non-revealers** — stakers who committed but never revealed (or never
  committed at all) are slashed by the same amount, since silent voters
  undermine the oracle.
* **Slashed \$AURA** flows into a **penalty pool** for that market.
* **Winning voters** then claim a proportional share of the penalty pool,
  weighted by their voting tier.

Dispute rewards are paid in \*\*$AURA** — the wrong side of a controversial
market literally funds the right side. See [Staking & Vaulting $AURA]\(/tokens/staking) for the slashing mechanics in
detail.

## Bonds & finalization

After a vote round resolves with a clear winner:

* **Bonds** — the winning side's representative (proposer or disputer)
  receives the full **proposer + disputer bond pool**.
* **Settlement** — winning share holders are paid out automatically in
  USDT.
* **Penalty bookkeeping** — once `applyVotePenalties` and
  `applyNonVoterPenalties` finish slashing, the penalty pool is finalized
  and winning voters can claim their rewards.

## TL;DR

* Most markets resolve **without** a vote — only disputed ones go through
  the commit/reveal flow.
* Voters lock a hashed vote, then reveal it; copy-voting is prevented.
* A **65% supermajority** is required; otherwise a new round runs.
* `TOO_EARLY` cancels the market and refunds traders.
* Voters are paid in **\$AURA** from a slashing pool, not in USDT fees.