When a market outcome is disputed, the protocol runs a commit/reveal vote among neutral $AURA stakers. This page walks through the voter’s perspective; for the full lifecycle (bonds, penalties, finalization) see Resolution & Disputes.Documentation Index
Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://aura-4ecab767.mintlify.app/llms.txt
Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.
How voting works
A dispute opens
A user disagrees with a proposed outcome and posts a disputer bond. This
triggers the vote.
Find the market
Sign in with your wallet, open the Voting tab, and select the
Outcomes section. Eligible disputed markets are listed with their
commit and reveal deadlines.
Commit your vote
During the commit phase, your wallet sends a hash of your choice
(
YES, NO, or TOO_EARLY) plus a random salt. Nobody — including
the protocol — can see what you actually picked yet.The salt is stored locally in your wallet. Do not lose it — you’ll
need it to reveal.Reveal your vote
Once the commit window closes, you have a shorter reveal window to
submit your choice and salt. The contract verifies the hash matches
your earlier commit and tallies your vote at your tier weight.
Eligibility
- **Vaulted AURA (Iron tier) at the time of the dispute.
- Neutral position — you cannot have placed any order on the disputed market, including during the dispute itself. The on-chain stake-holder registry is checked when you commit.
Vote choices
| Choice | Meaning |
|---|---|
YES / NO (or category option) | The outcome is decided in this direction. |
TOO_EARLY | The event hasn’t happened yet, the data source isn’t out, or the question is malformed. If this wins, the market is canceled and traders are refunded. |
Voting power by tier
| Tier | Voting weight |
|---|---|
| Degenerate | 30 |
| Diamond | 22 |
| Platinum | 16 |
| Gold | 11 |
| Silver | 7 |
| Bronze | 3 |
| Iron | 1 |
| None | 0 |
Rewards
Voters who back the winning outcome earn a share of the dispute’s penalty pool, paid in $AURA. The pool is funded by slashing two groups:- Wrong-side voters who revealed a vote for the losing outcome.
- Silent stakers who committed but never revealed, or never committed in a market they could have voted on.
TL;DR
- Commit a hash, then reveal — prevents copy-voting.
- 65% supermajority required; otherwise a new round runs.
TOO_EARLYcancels the market.- Winners are paid in $AURA from slashed wrong-side stakes.
- Wrong-side and silent voters lose $AURA — vote with care.

